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WHAT DOES "CONTAMINATION" MEAN? THE SECOND
CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO AN INSURANCE POLICY'S
CONTAMINATION EXCLUSION
Parks Real Estate Purchasing Group v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Parks Real Estate Purchasing Group v. St. Paul Fire and
Marine Ins. Co., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals subsided to one side
of a debate fought in courtrooms throughout the country.2 The circuit
court decided in order to define "contamination" within the meaning of an
insurance policy's contamination exclusion, it is important to consider the
rest of the contract and define "contamination" contextually.3  The
Second Circuit remanded the case to the trial court to resolve the question
of whether the damage was "contamination" within the meaning of the
Policy because coverage would depend upon how [subject] resolved that
issue.4 By taking a contextual approach, the Second Circuit allowed the
trial court to best determine the intention of the parties and force the
contract to fall within the reasonable expectations of the insured.5
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On September 11, 2001, the World Trade Center Twin Towers
became the site of a terrorist attack that killed thousands of Americans.
The collapse of the World Trade Center Towers caused a massive cloud of
particulate matter (i.e. the pulverized and corrosive contents of the fallen
towers) to form and spread throughout the downtown Manhattan area.6
' 472 F.3d 33 (2d. Cir. 2006).
2 Hi-G, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 391 F.2d 924 (1St Cir. 1968); Enron Oil
Trading & Transp. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., 132 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1997)..
3 Parks, 472 F.3d at 48.
4 Id. at 49.
'Id. at 42.
6 Parks Real Estate Purchasing Group v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 472 F.3d 33,
36 (2d. Cir. 2006). The pulverized contents included "hydroxyls (high pH), chlorides,
sulfates, organics, asbestos, lead, mercury, cadmium, quartz, beryllium, and mineral
wood." Id. at 37.
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The impact of the towers' collapse drove the cloud into a building the
plaintiff owned and the defendant insured 7
At the time of the attack, the plaintiff, Parks Real Estate
Purchasing Group ("Parks"), had an insurance policy agreement ("the
Policy") with the defendant, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company
("St. Paul"). The Policy included several express exclusion clauses
including a contamination exclusion.9
On September 18, 2001, Parks filed a Proof of Loss with St. Paul
claiming property damage to the insured building.' 0 Parks contended that
the damages and losses resulted from the collapse of the World Trade
Center Twin Towers." Parks claimed the damage from the particulate
cloud came from "corrosion, destruction, excessive wear, increased
maintenance and repair of the architectural fagade, mechanical, electrical,
structural and Heat Ventilation and Air Conditioning ('HVAC') systems
and other equipment and machinery including computers and related
hardware pertaining to and compromising the... [p]roperty and its
7 Id. Plaintiffs own the property at 90-100 John Street, New York, New York. Parks
Real Estate Purchasing Group v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 2005 WL 2414771
(S.D.N.Y.).
8 Parks, 472 F.3d at 37. The policy stated that St. Paul would "protect covered property
against risks of direct physical loss or damage except as indicated in the Exclusions-
Losses We Won't Cover section." Id. The policy further stated that St. Paul would cover
Parks' "financial interest in the covered building or structure," and, more specifically,
"machinery and equipment that are a permanent part of a building and are used to provide
building services such as elevators and heating equipment." Id. "Also covered were
'fixtures or yard fixtures,' property owned 'to service or maintain' the insured building,
and 'construction materials, supplies, and equipment' intended to be used for
maintaining, repairing, modifying, updating, or expanding the insured building." Id.
9 Parks Real Estate, 2005 WL 2414771, at *1. The exclusion section specifically stated
that:
(1) Defendant will not cover any loss or damage caused by or made worse by
any kind of contamination (the 'Contamination Exclusion');
(2) Defendant will not cover damage caused by mechanical breakdown (the
'Mechanical Breakdown Exclusion'); and




0 Parks, 472 F.3d at 37. The Proof of Loss notified St. Paul that the losses amounted to




surrounding environs."l2 After receiving this notice, St. Paul launched a
claim investigation and advanced $1,915,914.00 to Parks.13 Parks realized
this payment did not fully cover its losses and believed St. Paul had,
therefore, breached the Policy.14
On January 15, 2004, Parks filed its complaint in the Supreme
Court of the State of New York, County of New York, seeking to recover
the balance of its loss.' 5 After filing an answer to the complaint, St. Paul
filed a Notice of Removal, which succeeded in removing the case to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.' 6
Following discovery, St. Paul moved for summary judgment on December
15, 2004, arguing that the alleged damage was "contamination," and,
therefore, excluded under the Contamination Exclusion of the Policy.17
Parks, in order to defend its lawsuit, argued that two factors
precluded entry of summary judgment: (1) the Contamination Exclusion
was ambiguous, and the damage was not properly considered caused by
contamination; and (2) the "efficient cause"' 8 of the damage was the
collapse of the World Trade Center Twin Towers which the Policy
covered.19 Parks referred to a written report prepared by its expert, the RJ
Lee Group ("RJ Lee"), which described the causes of damage to the
12 id.
1 id.
14 Id. at 37.
1s Parks Real Estate Purchasing Group v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 472 F.3d 33,
37 (2d. Cir. 2006). Parks' complaint alleged that the "particulate matter from the [World
Trade Center] infiltrated much of the ... [p]roperty causing damage in the form of erosion,
corrosion, destruction, excessive wear, increased maintenance, and repair of the
architectural fagade, mechanical, electrical, structural, and Hear Ventilation and Air
Conditioning ('HVAC') systems and other equipment and machinery including
computers and related hardware pertaining to and comprising the... [p]roperty and its
surrounding environs." Id. at 37-38. Parks stated that "the elevators, electrical and
mechanical systems of its property...have been damaged and will continue to be
damaged." Id. at 38.
16 Id. at 37.
1 Id. at 38. St. Paul's motion for summary judgment also argued that the alleged
damages also fell under the "Mechanical Breakdown" and "Wear and Tear" exclusions
which also bar recovery. Id.
1 Id. at 48. "Efficient cause" means the "predominant cause of the loss or damage." Id.
19 Parks Real Estate, 2005 WL 2414771, at *1.
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building. 20 The RJ Lee report stated that the "functionality of building
systems has been damaged by the infiltration of corrosive, abrasive, and
hazardous [World Trade Center] [p]articulate forced into the building by
the collapse of the [World Trade Center]."21
On September 28, 2005, the Southern District of New York
granted St. Paul's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Policy's
Contamination Exclusion barring coverage was applicable. 22 The district
court stated that "contamination" is generally defined as "the introduction
of a foreign substance that injures the usefulness of the object,"23 or a
condition of impurity resulting from the mixture or contact with a foreign
substance." 24  The district court went on to state that using either
definition leads to the same conclusion -- that the issue at hand could be
classified as contamination because "[t]he airborne particulate matter
created as a result of the [World Trade Center] collapse [was] properly
considered either a foreign substance that came into contact with the
20 Parks, 472 F.3d at 38. RJ Lee concluded that the particulate matter found in the cloud
had an "unprecedented complexity and [was] pervasively found in all building systems
and components, and present[ed] an ongoing source of re-entrainment and thus damage
to cleaned or newly installed mechanical systems." Id. The Report went on:
The corrosive, abrasive, and hazardous material includes[,] but is not limited to,
hydroxyls (high pH), chlorides, sulfates, organics, asbestos, lead, mercury,
cadmium, quartz, beryllium, and mineral wool, and was found on all floors and
in all building systems sampled, in concentrations substantially in excess of
those found in non-impacted buildings. Many of these substances are known
toxins or carcinogens individually: little is known about the magnitude of the
collective threat to human health, except that it will be greater than the threat
from the individual substances. In the building's current condition, accelerated
cleaning programs will need to be employed to ensure that long-term risk to
occupants is minimized.
Id.
21 Id. The report went more in-depth and pointed out specific damage to building
systems, components, and equipment, such as: "[T]he [World Trade Center] Particulate
will also chemically and/or electronically corrode the metallic conductors on electronic
devices and cause component failures." Id.
22 Parks Real Estate, 2005 WL 2414771 at *7.
23 Id. at *3 (citing Hi-G, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 391 F.2d 924, 925 (in




[p]roperty creating a condition of impurity or a foreign substance that,
when introduced to the property, injured the property's usefulness." 25
The district court focused on the effect of the particulate matter,
writing that "[w]hether the airborne substance at issue [was] considered
pulverized, abrasive, corrosive, erosive, particulate or contaminant, the
effect on the property was contamination."26 The court found that the
Contamination Exclusion made the actual cause irrelevant because the
exclusion barred coverage on damages "caused by or made worse by any
kind of contamination."27 Next, the court determined that the collapse of
the World Trade Center was not the cause of the loss but rather the
contamination that affected the property in the wake of the collapse. 28
The court also concluded that the "proper efficient cause" analysis did not
involve a "look at the efficient cause of the contamination," but a look into
the "efficient cause of the loss" which was the contamination itself.29 The
trial court also found that neither the Mechanical Exclusion nor the Wear
and Tear Exclusion were applicable. 30
On appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's order to
grant summary judgment for the defendant, St. Paul. The Second Circuit
ultimately vacated the summary judgment that the trial court granted, and
it remanded the case. 3 1  The appellate court found that the term
"contamination" was ambiguous in context of the St. Paul Policy and that
the two definitions that the district court used in its determination would
allow the Contamination Exclusion to be applied to an endless amount of
situations.32 The Second Circuit remanded the case back to the trial court
because the determination of whether the damage was "contamination"
was a question yet to be resolved, and coverage would depend upon
25 Id.
26 Id. at *4.
27 Id. at *5.
28 Parks Real Estate, 2005 WL 2414771, at *5.2 9 Parks, 472 F.3d at 40.30 id.
31 Id. at 49.
32 Id. at 45.
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whether the damage was "contamination" within the meaning of the
Policy. 33
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.. Insurance Contracts Interpretation Under New York Law
In the world of commercial property insurance policies there are
generally two types of policies: "all-risk" policies and "named perils"
policies.34 An all-risk policy typically covers "losses caused by any
fortuitous peril not specifically excluded under the policy."35 A named
perils policy, on the other hand, merely covers the losses that were
suffered from a peril enumerated in the policy. 36
Common law has provided that when there is a dispute involving
certain terms of an insurance contract, the "insurance contract is
interpreted to give effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in the
clear language of the contract." 37 Interpretation of a contract is a matter of
law that the court must determine. 38  The ambiguity of a contract is
however, a "threshold question of law to be determined by the court."
According to the court:
[A]n ambiguity exists where the terms of an insurance contract
could suggest more than one meaning when viewed objectively by
a reasonably intelligent person who has examined the context of
the entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of the
33 Id. at 49. The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that "the actual contact of
the airborne particulate matter with the property was the efficient cause of damage to the
insured building." Id.
34 Real Estate Purchasing Group v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 472 F.3d 33, 41
(2d. Cir. 2006).
3 Id. (citing Ostrager & Newman, Insurance Coverage Disputes, § 21.02[a], at 1306 (13'h
ed. 2006)).
36 Id. (citing J. Draper, Coverage under all-risk insurance, 30 A.L.R. 5t' 170, 1995 WL
900253 (1995)).
37 Id. at 42. Courts must enforce contracts as written when the provisions are
unambiguous and understandable. Id.
38 d.




customs, practices, usages and terminology as generally
understood in the particular trade or business. 40
New York insurance law places a significant burden on the insurer to
make certain that "the exclusion is stated in clear and unmistakable
language, is subject to no other reasonable interpretation, and that its. . .
exclusion is the only construction that [could] be fairly placed thereon."
If the court finds the contract's language to be doubtful or uncertain, then
the court will resolve the ambiguity against the insurer.4 2 Courts may
review extrinsic evidence to determine what the parties intended any
insurance provision to mean when the court finds the provision
43
ambiguous. However, the law remains clear in placing the burden on
the insurer to prove that its interpretation of the contract is correct.44
B. Contamination Exclusion
When looking at all-risk insurance policies that include
contamination exclusions, it is extremely important to determine the
definition of "contamination."45 It would be helpful if the insurance
policy explicitly defined "contamination", but when a definition is not
available, the courts have to define the term.46 Some courts have used the
40 Real Estate Purchasing Group v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 472 F.3d 33, 42
(2d. Cir. 2006). (citing Morgan Stanley Group Inc. v. New England Ins. Co., 225 F.3d
270, 275 (2d Cir. 2000)). "An insurance policy should be read in light of common
speech and the reasonable expectations of a businessperson." Id. (citing Pepsico, Inc. v.
Winterhur Int'l Am. Ins. Co., 13 A.D.3d 599, 788 N.Y.S.2d 142, 144 (N.Y.App.Div.
2004)).
41 Id. (citing Throgs Neck Bagels, Inc., v. GA Ins. Co. of N.Y., 241 A.D.2d 66, 68-69
(N.Y.App.Div. 1998)).
42 Id. Policy exclusions "are not to be extended by interpretation or implication but are to
be accorded a strict and narrow construction" and any ambiguity will be found in favor of
coverage. Id. at 43 (citing Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Gillette Co., 486 N.Y.S.2d 873, 876
(1984)).
43 Id. (citing Morgan Stanley Group Inc., 225 F.3d at 275-276).
44Id.
45 Id.
46Real Estate Purchasing Group v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 472 F.3d 33, 42
(2d. Cir. 2006).
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definition of contamination as being "the introduction of a foreign
substance that injures the usefulness of the object" 4 7 or "a condition of
impurity resulting from the mixture or contact with a foreign substance." 48
In Hi-G, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Ins. Co.,4 9 the First Circuit denied the
plaintiffs claim that if a word has more than one common meaning, then
the policy should automatically be construed against the insurance
company.50 The First Circuit did not want to embrace this rule, because it
meant that the insurance company would always lose since the insured
would insist on the inapplicable meaning.5 1  The First Circuit then
concluded that contamination was understood to mean "the introduction of
a foreign substance that injures the usefulness of the object." 52
Other courts, however, have opted to define contamination
contextually.53 The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of defining
contamination contextually in an insurance policy in Enron Oil Trading &
Transp. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co. 54 and rejected the insurer's approach to
defining "contamination" in order to find the definition through the
context of the relevant exclusion.5 5  The Ninth Circuit's reasoning for
construing the word within the context of the exclusion was that the
insurer's approach to defining "contamination" would include a wide
array of situations that would reach well beyond the reasonable
4 Parks, 2005 WL 2414771 at *3 (citing Hi-G, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.,
391 F.2d 924, 925 (1st Cir. 1968)).4 8 Id. at *3 (citing Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Penn. v. Myrick, 304 F.2d 179, 183 (5" Cir.
1962)). The Fifth Circuit based its definition of "contamination" as being "a condition of
impurity resulting from the mixture or contact with a foreign substance" from Webster's
New International Dictionary. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Penn. v. Myrick, 304 F.2d at
183.
49 Hi-G, Inc., 391 F.2d 924.
s0 Id. at 925.
51 Id.
52 Id.
" Parks, 472 F.3d at 44. The Ninth Circuit ultimately agreed with the district court that
"although contamination is not defined in the policy, it must be construed with the
context of the pollution exclusion." Id. (citing Enron Oil Trading & Transp. Co. v.
Walbrook Ins. Co., 132 F.3d 526 ( 9 th Cir. 1997)).
54 132 F.3d 526 (9t Cir. 1997).
" Enron Oil, 132 F.3d at 530.
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expectations of the insured.56 In Enron Oil, the Ninth Circuit determined
that the exclusion's use of the phrase "seepage, pollution, and
contamination," signaled that a reasonable reader would infer that the
contamination exclusion dealt with environmental harms.5 7
The Seventh Circuit has also used an approach that considers the
context of an exclusion clause in order to determine the meaning of a
relevant word. In Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester Fire
Ins. Co.,5 9 the Seventh Circuit concluded that the insurer's desired use of
the terms "irritant" and "contaminant" were virtually boundless because
"there is virtually no substance or chemical in existence that would not
irritate or damage some person or property." 60 By considering context in
determining a term's meaning, courts attempt to avoid the danger of
sweeping into the exclusion's net a wide array of situations that a sensible
reader would not infer through a reading of the exclusion clause.6 1
C. Efficient Causation
"In order to obtain coverage under a first-party [insurance] policy,
the insured must suffer a loss caused by a covered peril (in a named perils
policy) or suffer a loss not caused by an excluded peril (in an all risk
56 Id. The Ninth Circuit claimed that, under the insurer's interpretation, the
contamination exclusion would be "virtually limitless, extending to claims for product
liability.. .or for negligence.. .that arguably involved an impurity resulting from contact
with a foreign substance." Id.
57 id.
58 Parks, 472 F.3d at 44.
s9 976 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1992).
60 1d. at 1043. The court further stated that:
[W]ithout some limiting principle, the pollution exclusion clause would extend
far beyond its intended scope, and lead to some absurd results. To take but two
simple examples, reading the clause broadly would bar coverage for bodily
injuries suffered by one who slips and falls on the spilled contents of a bottle of
Drano, and for bodily injury caused by an allergic reaction to chlorine in a
public pool. Although Drano and chlorine are both irritants or contaminants that
cause, under certain conditions, bodily injury or property damage, one would not
ordinarily characterize these events as pollution.
Id.
61 Parks, 472 F.3d at 45.
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policy)."62 "A covered peril and an excluded peril can combine to cause a
covered loss." 63 "In a case where a covered and excluded peril combine
to cause a covered loss, courts typically apply the efficient proximate
cause rule, meaning that the insured is entitled to coverage only if the
covered peril is the 'predominant cause of the loss or damage."' 64
"The efficient proximate cause of a loss is the cause that originally
sets other events in motion." 65  "Only the most direct and obvious
[efficient) cause should be looked to for purposes of the exclusionary
clause."6 "When the court interprets an insurance policy excluding from
coverage any injuries 'caused by' a certain class of conditions, the
causation inquiry stops at the efficient physical cause of the loss." 67 Once
a court is able to establish the "efficient cause" of a loss, the court can
determine if it falls under any applicable exclusion clauses contained in
the insurance policy, which is what the Second Circuit was forced to do in
its decision in Parks.8
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Second Circuit amply pointed out the fact that parties entering
into a contract should provide clear, understandable, and unambiguous
terms in the contract in order to avoid confusion and allow the courts to
enforce the terms of the contract as they were written.6 9  The Second
6 Id. at 48 (citing Ostrager & Newman, Insurance Coverage Disputes, § 21.02[c], at
1313).
63 Id. See Shelter Mutual Ins. Co. v. Maples, 309 F. 3d 1068, 1070-1071 (81h Cir. 2002)
(where frozen pipes, a covered peril, caused mold, an excluded peril, that resulted in the
loss).
64 Parks, 472 F.3d at 48; See also Lynch v. Travelers Indem. Co., 452 F.2d 1065, 1067
(8th Cir. 1972); 10 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance §§ 148:60,
148:61 (3d ed. 1998).
61 Parks, 472 F.3d at 48 (citing Kula v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 628 N.Y.S.2d 988,
991 (N.Y.App.Div. 1995)).
66 Id.
6 7 Id. (citing Kimmins Indus. Serv. Corp. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 78, 81 (2d Cir.
1994)). "It does not trace events back to their metaphysical beginnings." Id.
68 Real Estate Purchasing Group v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 472 F.3d 33, 49
(2d. Cir. 2006).
' Id. at 42.
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Circuit found that the term "contamination" was ambiguous as used in the
Policy because the common definition, which St. Paul convinced the
district court to use, was limitless in situations in which it could apply. 70
The Second Circuit recognized that courts other than the district
court had taken the same approach in attempting to define contamination
exclusions as a foreign substance affecting usefulness or creating an
impurity.7  However, the Second Circuit did not find this authority very
persuasive due to its "virtually boundless" applications.72 The court
reached this conclusion after applying the district court's definition of
"contamination" to several examples.73 The first hypothetical the court
contemplated slightly changed the fact pattern of the present case and
involved the World Trade Center Twin Towers collapsing directly upon
the Property and, subsequently, causing damage. 74 The Second Circuit
realized that this loss would undoubtedly be covered under the all-risk
insurance Policy between the plaintiff and defendant, but St. Paul could
still argue that the loss in the example was a result of "contamination"
when using the definition of the district court.
The Second Circuit then considered the example of a fire, which
would also be an insurable event or peril. 6 Cantrell v. Farm Bureau
Town & Country Ins. Co. of Missouri7 7 specifically addressed this
example with an all-risk insurance policy that excluded coverage under
70 Id. at 45. Once again, the definition that the district court employed was that
"contamination" was "the introduction of a foreign substance that injures the usefulness
of the object" or "a condition of impurity resulting from the mixture or contact with a
foreign substance." Id.
71 Id. at 43. Cases that use the same definition of "contamination" as the district court are
Hi-G, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 391 F.2d 924, 925 (1st Cir. 1968); JS.
French Auto. Castings, Inc. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 2003 WL 21730127 (N.D.Ill. July
23, 2003); American Cas. Co. ofReading, Pa. v. Myrick, 304 F.2d 179, 184 (5th Cir.
1962); Auten v. Employers Nat. Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Tex.App. 1986).
72 Parks, 472 F.3d at 45.
7 Id.
74 Real Estate Purchasing Group v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 472 F.3d 33, 45
(2d. Cir. 2006).
75 Id. The Twin Towers collapse on the building could be argued as the "introduction of
a foreign substance that injure[d] the usefulness of the object." Id.
7 Id. Ash and soot, which result from a fire, could be argued to be a foreign substance
introduced to the house that damaged its usefulness. Id.
1 876 S.W.2d 660 (Mo.Ct.App. 1994).
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"contamination," but expressly covered any losses resulting from "fire"
and "smoke."78  After a fire on the insured property, the insurance
company denied a plaintiffs claim, reasoning that the event fell under the
contamination exclusion's meaning of "to make inferior or impure by
admixture."79 The court in Cantrell found the word "contamination"
ambiguous and concluded that "a reasonable person would not determine
that smoke damage caused by a covered fire, would be excluded from
coverage."80  After reviewing Cantrell, the Second Circuit noted that
using a broad definition of "contamination" casts a broad net across
situations that directly conflict with other sections of an insurance policy
when taking the definition of "contamination" into consideration
contextually. 8 1
Next, the Second Circuit considered an example of a soft drink
company using faulty ingredients in its products, which would also be a
covered peril. 82 In Pepsico, Inc. v. Winterthur Int'l Am. Ins. Co.," this
exact situation occurred with the insured possessing an all-risk insurance
policy that contained a contamination exclusion. 84 The insurance
company in Pepsico also attempted to deny coverage by citing the
contamination exclusion to mean "to make inferior or impure by
mixture."85 In Pepsico, the New York State Supreme Court preferred a
commonsense approach over a literal approach in order to reach a
conclusion that fell in line with the "reasonable expectations of a
businessperson who has come to understand standard pollution exclusions
as exclusions addressing environmental-type harms." 86  The court in
Pepsico realized that there needed to be limits placed upon the definition
78 Id. at 662. In Cantrell, the plaintiffs home suffered from a fire, which caused toxic
fumes and chemicals to spread throughout the house, and consequently, the house was
uninhabitable. Id.
7 1 Id. at 664.
'
0 Id. at 664-665.
81 Parks, 472 F.3d at 48.82 Id. at 47.
81 13 A.D.3d 599, 788 N.Y.S.2d 142, 144 (N.Y.App.Div. 2004).
8 Id. at 143. The faulty ingredients that the plaintiff used caused the soft drinks to have
an unintended taste and the plaintiff was, consequently, forced to destroy the spoiled
drinks. Id.




of "contamination" or there would be virtually no limit to its application in
excluding coverage. The Second Circuit found this logic very
persuasive.
In determining the present case, the Second Circuit found that
these examples, along with numerous other applicable situations, would
allow any unintended damages to fall under a contamination exclusion if
the court followed the broad terms used by the district court." The court
reasoned that a construction using such broad terms would allow the all-
risk policy to "insure against virtually nothing." 89 The court determined
that because the broad application of the insurer's definition of
"contamination" was limitless, both parties should be permitted to submit
evidence of the intended use of the ambiguous term. 90 The Second Circuit
stated that, upon remand, the district court should opt for a contextual
approach when determining the meaning of the term "contamination" as it
is used in the all-risk insurance policy between the two parties.91
The Second Circuit then made a determination concerning the
efficient cause of the damage to the building.92 The Circuit court agreed
with the antecedent court's finding that "the actual contact of the airborne
particulate matter with the [p]roperty was the efficient cause of damage to
the insured Building."93 The court then stated that the contamination was
not the cause of the damage but was the resulting damage itself.94 The
Second Circuit concluded that whether the aforementioned damage was
"contamination" was a question that still needed to be determined by both
parties' evidence in the present case.9 5
87 Parks, 472 F.3d at 48.88 Id.
89 id.
90I d. The Second Circuit stated that they were "not so sure that the damage caused by
the settling of the airborne matter into Parks' building, machinery, and equipment was
intended by the parties to constitute contamination." Id.
9i Real Estate Purchasing Group v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 472 F.3d 33, 48
(2d. Cir. 2006).
9 Id. at 49.
9 id.
94 id.
9s Id. The court stated that:
[s]aid differently, while the cloud of particulate matter caused damage to the
insured [p]roperty, coverage will depend upon whether that damage was
185
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Based on the preceding reasoning, the Second Circuit concluded
that the district court's grant of summary judgment should be vacated, and
the case should be remanded in order for the district court to take a
contextual approach to the definition of "contamination" and allow both
parties to introduce evidence of what was intended by the use of this
ambiguous term.9 6
V. COMMENT
It is sometimes difficult for a court to come into a dispute and
enforce a contract the exact way in which both parties believed the
contract dealt with a particular issue. 9 7 This is exactly why courts enforce
unambiguous and understandable provisions exactly as they are written.
However, when parties to a contract cannot agree about a provision's
meaning, then the court should read the policy in light of common speech
and the reasonable expectations of a businessperson. 99
If a court should read a policy in light of the reasonable
expectations of a businessperson, it would be a direct conflict for the court
to allow a broad definition of "contamination" that the insurer wishes to
use.100 By opting for a contextual definition of contamination, 01 the
Second Circuit was in the best position to read the policy in light of the
reasonable expectations of a businessperson. There is plentiful rationale
behind taking a contextual approach. Insurance companies create and
enter into multiple contracts daily that cover the same provisions and
exclusions. Therefore, insurance companies have reason to know of
"contamination" within the meaning of this Policy. Insofar as the damage
constituted contamination, it is excluded from coverage. Insofar as the damage
was not contamination, however, it is covered.
Id.
96 id.
9 Real Estate Purchasing Group v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 472 F.3d 33, 42
(2d. Cir. 2006).
98 Id. See also Prange v. Int'l Life Ins. Co. of St. Louis, 46 S.W.2d 523 (Mo. 1932).
9 Parks, 472 F.3d at 42 (citing Pepsico v. Winterhur Int'l Am. Ins. Co., 788 N.Y.S.2d
142, 144 (N.Y.App.Div. 2004). See also Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., Ltd., 785
S.W.2d 728 (Mo.Ct.App. 1990).
" Parks, 472 F.3d at 43.
.o. Id. at 49.
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uncertainties of meaning within its policies and, as a consequence, the
policies should be read in a light most favorable to the insured. 02 The
Second Restatement of Contracts explicitly addresses situations similar to
the case at hand. 103 It states that in some instances, a company may leave
the definition of a term or provision deliberately obscure so that at a later
point in time, typically when it is the issue of litigation, the company can
choose which definition best suits its needs at the time.' The Second
Circuit correctly identified the problem with allowing the insurer to use
the definition of "contamination" to include virtually any circumstances or
situations in the contamination exclusion. 0 5 If the court allowed a broad
definition of "contamination" to be used in determining the coverage of
the policy, then the court would have gone directly against the rule of
reading the policy in light of the reasonable expectations of a
businessperson. 0 6
Additionally, if the court is striving to fulfill the reasonable
expectations of a businessperson, then the most logical approach is one
that takes into consideration the contract in its totality. Insurance
companies are inconsistent in representing to consumers that there is
comprehensive coverage in their contracts, while at the same time they
limit their liability by placing exceptions or exclusions in so-called omni-
bus policies.' 0 7 Therefore, it is not surprising that courts should disfavor
this quasi-consumer fraud by using several judicial interpretation tools. 0 8
In order to counteract the insurance companies' least desirable acts, courts
need to construe the exclusions narrowly. The courts can do this by using
policies of interpretation and construction, in addition to public policy, to
define "contamination" contextually rather than permitting the all-




"o Parks, 472 F.3d at10 6 Id. at 49.
107 Williston on Contracts § 49:111 (4 th ed. 2006).108 Id. See also Ganapolsky v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 138 F.3d 446 (1s' Cir. 1998);
Stoney Run Co. v. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1995); State
of N.Y. v. Blank, 27 F.3d 783 (2d Cir. 1994); Ritter v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 573
F.2d 539 ( 8th Cir. 1978).
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encompassing definitions set forth by the insurance companies.109 The
only way to make the reasonable expectations doctrine effective is to force
insurance companies to use language that is "clear, plain, and
conspicuous" within their contamination exclusions.1 0 This would avoid
situations in which the reasonable businessperson anticipates coverage,
but the insurance company believes the situation is under the excluded
risks and is, therefore, not covered."'
One of the criticisms of the contextual approach is that the courts
may overstep their boundaries and create coverage issues that the
insurance policy clearly did not intend to encompass. 112 Keeping in mind
the fact that courts should only be forced to interpret and construct
contract language when it contains an ambiguity, it is important to
recognize that courts cannot read into and enforce terms which are clearly
contradictory to the written provisions of the contract.11 3  The courts
cannot be proactive in policing contracts and the terms therein when there
is no ambiguity because the courts have no warrant to use strained
construction by stretching words to find against the insurer. 114 When the
language is clear, there is no need to consider the context in order to find a
working definition of terms, and the exclusion should be given full
effect." 5
Another reason courts should not use a broad definition set forth
by insurance companies ex-post facto, but rather determine the definition
of the word through context in order to comply with the reasonable
expectations of a businessperson, is due to the fact that the allocation of
risk is more easily burdened by the insurance company.116 All-risk policy
109 Id.
110 Id.
"' Id. See also Saltarelli v. Bob Baker Group Medical Trust, 35 F.3d 382 (9 th Cir. 1994);
Lancaster v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 934 F.Supp 1137 (N.D.Cal. 1996).
112
113 Schenkel & Schultz, Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co., 119 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1997); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shahan, 141 F.3d 819 (8th Cir. 1998); F.D.I.C. v. American
Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 998 F.2d 404 (7th Cir. 1993).114 Williston on Contracts § 49:111.
115 Porterfield v. Audubon Indem. Co., 2002 WL 31630705 (Ala. 2002). The court stated
that when there is clear language courts cannot defeat the express provisions by creating a
new contract for the parties. Id.
116 Couch on Insurance § 22:32.
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seekers, by definition, typically find insurance policies that cover any
possible loss the insured may endure since such policies cover any losses
caused by any fortuitous peril.' 17  The reasonable expectations doctrine
becomes a factor in order to provide coverage where a reasonable person
who purchased an all-risk insurance policy would construe the policy as
affording coverage." 8 Interpreting broadly defined exclusions at a point
in time after the contract is entered into would eliminate enough coverage
so as to destroy the bargain the insured thought had been entered into.1l9
In light of the problems presented by adopting the broad
interpretation of "contamination" presented by St. Paul, the Second Circuit
correctly identified the best course of action in remanding the case back to
the lower court in order for the definition of "contamination" to be defined
contextually.1 20  If the court allowed the broad, sweeping definition of
"contamination" to stand, the reasonable expectations of the insured would
not have been fulfilled.121 By defining "contamination" contextually, the
Second Circuit allows the trial court to give effect to the intention of the
parties entering into the contract.' 22
117 Ostrager & Newman, Insurance Coverage Disputes, § 21.02[a], at 1306 (13th ed.
2006).
118 Couch on Insurance §22:32. Couch further states: "The standard of reasonable
construction requires that effect be given to exceptions and limitations couched in
language which has a plain meaning, and which is not inconsistent with other clauses or
provisions of the contract." Id.
119 Id. To put it in other words:
The far-reaching consequences of the expectations doctrine may be appreciated
by considering the countless insurance policies which begin with a broad
sweeping declaration of the general coverage afforded and then later at some
other location in the policy, often buried between definitions, conditions, and
provisions, limit the coverage by exclusions or limitations which, though
couched in language for the most part understandable after careful
consideration, is at best confusing in light of the cursory examination made by
the vast majority of the insureds.
Perlet, The Insurance Contract and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectation, 6 Forum
116, 126 (Jan. 1971).
120 Parks, 472 F.3d at 48.
121 Id. at 42.
122 id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Parks answered a question that has forced many courts to split.
Several courts have adopted a broad definition of "contamination" which
allows virtually any situation to fall under the contamination exclusion and
leave the insured with huge losses that they thought would be covered by
the insurance. Other courts have taken the approach of defining
"contamination" contextually in order to determine which definition best
fits each specific situation. Parks took the approach of defining
"contamination" contextually in order to restrict exclusion from coverage.
At the same time, Parks' approach allows future courts the flexibility of a
pragmatic definition, which allows the court to determine the definition on
a case-by-case basis.
ROBERT CORNEJO
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